Fast Pseudo-Random Fingerprints by Bachrach, Yoram & Porat, Ely
Fast Pseudo-Random Fingerprints
Yoram Bachrach1, Ely Porat2
1 Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK (yobach@micorosft.com)
2 Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel (porately@cs.biu.ac.il)
Abstract. We propose a method to exponentially speed up computation of var-
ious fingerprints, such as the ones used to compute similarity and rarity in mas-
sive data sets. Rather then maintaining the full stream of b items of a universe
[u], such methods only maintain a concise fingerprint of the stream, and perform
computations using the fingerprints. The computations are done approximately,
and the required fingerprint size k depends on the desired accuracy  and con-
fidence δ. Our technique maintains a single bit per hash function, rather than a
single integer, thus requiring a fingerprint of length k = O( ln
1
δ
2
) bits, rather than
O(log u · ln 1δ
2
) bits required by previous approaches. The main advantage of the
fingerprints we propose is that rather than computing the fingerprint of a stream
of b items in time of O(b · k), we can compute it in time O(b log k). Thus this
allows an exponential speedup for the fingerprint construction, or alternatively al-
lows achieving a much higher accuracy while preserving computation time. Our
methods rely on a specific family of pseudo-random hashes for which we can
quickly locate hashes resulting in small values.
1 Introduction
Hashing is a key tool in processing massive data sets. Many uses of hashing in vari-
ous applications require computing many hash functions in parallel. In this paper we
present a technique that “ties together” many hashes in a novel way, which enables
us to speed up such algorithms by an exponential factor. Our method also works for
some complicated hash function such as min-wise independent families of hashes. In
this paper we focus on producing an optimal similarity fingerprint using this method,
but our technique is general, as it is easy to use our approach to speed up other hash in-
tensive computations. One easy example where our technique applies is approximating
the number of distinct elements from [1]. A another example, which requires a slightly
stronger analysis, is computing of Lp sketches [13] for 0 ≤ p ≤ 2 .
Min-wise independent families of hash functions, which we call MWIFs for short,
were introduced in [16,6]. Computations using MWIFs have been used in many al-
gorithms for processing massive data streams. The properties of MWIFs allow main-
taining concise descriptions of massive streams. These descriptions, called “finger-
prints” or “sketches”, allow computing properties of these streams and relations be-
tween them. Examples of such “fingerprint” computations include data summerization
and subpopulation-size queries [9,8], greedy list intersection [14], approximating rarity
and similarity for data streams [10], collaborative filtering fingerprints [4,3,2] and es-
timating frequency moments [1]. Another motivation for studying MWIFs is reducing
the amount of randomness used by algorithms [7,16,6].
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Recent research reduced the amount of information stored, while accurately com-
puting properties data streams. Such techniques improve the space complexity, but
much less attention has been given to computation complexity. For example, many
streaming algorithms compute huge amounts of hashes, as they apply many hashes to
each element in a very long stream of elements. This leads to a high computation time,
not always tractable for many applications.
Our main contribution is a method allowing an exponential speedup in computation
time for constructing fingerprints of massive data streams. Our technique is general, and
can speed up many processes that apply many random hashes. The heart of the method
lies in using a specific family of pseudo-random hashes shown to be approximately-
MWIF [12], and for which we can quickly locate the hashes resulting in a small value
of an element under the hash. Similarly to [17] we use the fact that members of the
family are pairwise independent between themselves. We also extend the technique and
show one can maintain just a single bit rather than the full element IDs, thus improving
the fingerprint size. Independently of us [15] also considered storing few bits per hash
function, but focused only on minimizing storage rather than computation time.
1.1 Preliminaries
Let H be a family of functions over the same source X and target Y , so each h ∈ H is
a function h : X → Y , where Y is a completely ordered set. We say thatH is min-wise
independent if, when randomly choosing a function h ∈ H , for any subset C ⊆ X , any
x ∈ C has an equal probability of being the minimal after applying h.
Definition 1. H is min-wise independent (MWIF), if for all C ⊆ X , for any x ∈ C,
Prh∈H [h(x) = mina∈Ch(a)] = 1|C|
Definition 2. H is a γ-approximately min-wise independent (γ-MWIF), if for all C ⊆
X , for any x ∈ C,
∣∣∣Prh∈H [h(x) = mina∈Ch(a)]− 1|C| ∣∣∣ ≤ γ|C|
Definition 3. H is k-wise independent, if for all x1, x2, . . . , xk, y1, y2, . . . , yk ⊆ X ,
Prh∈H [(h(x1) = y1) ∧ . . . ∧ (h(xk) = yk)] = 1|X|k
2 Pseudo-Random Family of Hashes
We describe the hashes we use.Given the universe of item IDs [u], consider a big prime
p, such that p > u. Consider taking random coefficients for a d-degree polynomial in
Zp. Let a0, a1, . . . , ad ∈ [p] be chosen uniformly at random from [p], and the following
polynomial in Zp: f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + . . .+ adxd. We denote by Fd the family
of all d-degree polynomials in Zp with coefficients in Zp, and later choose members of
this family uniformly at random. Indyk [12] shows that choosing a function f from Fd
uniformly at random results in Fd being a γ-MWIF for d = O(log 1γ ).
Randomly choosing a0, . . . , ad is equivalent to choosing a member of Fd uniformly
at random, so f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + . . .+ adxd is a hash chosen at random from
the γ-MWIF Fd. Similarly, consider b0, b1, . . . , bd ∈ [p] be chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from [p], and g(x) = b0 + b1x + b2x2 + . . . + bdxd, which is also a hash chosen
at random from the γ-MWIF Fd. Now consider the hashes h0(x) = f(x), h1(x) =
f(x) + g(x), h2(x) = f(x) + 2g(x), . . . , hi(x) = f(x) + ig(x), . . . , hk−1(x) =
f(x) + (k − 1)g(x). We call this random construction procedure for f(x), g(x) the
base random construction, and the construction of hi the composition construction. We
prove properties of such hashes. We denote the probability of an event E when the hash
h is constructed by choosing f, g using the base random construction and composing
h(x) = f(x) + i · g(x) (for some i ∈ [p]) as Prh(E).
Lemma 1 (Uniform Minimal Values). Let f, g be constructed using the base random
construction, using d = O(log 1γ ). For any z ∈ [u], any X ⊆ [u] and any value i used
to compose h(x) = f(x) + i · g(x): Prh[h(z) < miny∈X(h(y)] = (1± γ) 1|X| .
Proof. Fix i, z ∈ [u] and X ⊆ [u], construct f, g using the base random construction,
and compose h(x) = f(x) + i · g(x). Note in i · g(x) = i · (b0 + b1x+ . . . bdxd), the
coefficient of xj is q = (i ·bj) mod p. Given a value s ∈ [p] There is exactly one value
in r ∈ [p] such that (q + r) mod p = s. Thus, for any s ∈ [p], the probability that the
coefficient of xj in h(x) is s is 1p . Therefor Prh[h(x) ≡ p(x)] = 1pd+1 = 1Fd . We have:
Prh[h(z) < miny∈Xh(y)] =
∑
p(x)∈Fd Prh[h(z) < miny∈Xh(y)|h(x) ≡ f(x) +
i · g(x) ≡ p(x)] · Prh[h(x) ≡ p(x)] =
∑
p(x)∈Fd
Prh[h(z)<miny∈Xh(y)|h(x)≡p(x)]
|Fd| =∑
p(x)∈Fd
Pr[p(z)<miny∈X(p(y))]
|Fd| = Prp(x)∈Fd [p(z) < miny∈X(p(y))] = (1± γ) 1|X| .
If p(x) is a polynom such that for any z ∈ Zp we have p(z) < miny∈X(p(y)), then we
have Pr[p(z) < miny∈X(p(y))] = 1, and otherwise Pr[p(z) < miny∈X(p(y))] = 0.
Thus we get
∑
p(x)∈Fd
Pr[p(z)<miny∈X(p(y))]
|Fd| = Prp(x)∈Fd [p(z) < miny∈X(p(y))].
The last transition uses the fact that Fd is an γ-MWIF, which requires d = O(log 1γ ).
Lemma 2 (Pairwise Interaction). Let f, g be constructed using the base random con-
struction, using d = O(log 1γ ). For all x1, x2 ∈ [u] and all X1, X2 ⊆ [u], and all i 6= j
used to compose hi(x) = f(x) + i · g(x) and hj(x) = f(x) + j · g(x):
Prf,g∈Fd [(hi(x1) < miny∈X1hi(y))∧(hj(x2) < miny∈X2hi(y))] = (1±γ)2
1
|X1| · |X2|
Proof. Given p1(x) ∈ Fd = u0 + u1x + . . . + udxd and p2(x) ∈ Fd = v0 + v1x +
. . . + vdx
d, there is exactly one pair of polynoms f(x), g(x) ∈ Fd such that both
f(x) + i · g(x) = p1(x) and f(x) + j · g(x) = p2(x). Each coefficient location l ∈ [d]
results in two equations with two unknowns in Zp, with a single solution (al, bl) (where
al is the coefficient of xl in f(x), and bl is the coefficient of xl in g(x).
Fix i 6= j, x1, x2 ∈ [u] and X1, X2 ⊆ [u], construct f, g using the base ran-
dom construction, and compose hi(x) = f(x) + i · g(x), hj(x) = f(x) + j · g(x).
For brevity, denote mi1 = miny∈X1 hi(y). Similarly, denote m
j
2 = miny∈X2 hj(y).
We have: Prf,g∈Fd [(hi(x1) < m
i
1) ∧ (hj(x2) < mj2)] =
∑
p1,p2∈Fd Pr[(hi(x1) <
mi1) ∧ (hj(x2) < mj2)|(hi(x) ≡ p1(x) ∧ hj(x) ≡ p2(x))] · Pr[(hi(x) ≡ p1(x) ∧
hj(x) ≡ p2(x))] =
∑
p1,p2∈Fd
Pr[(hi(x1)<m
i
1)∧(hj(x2)<mj2)|(hi(x)≡p1(x)∧hj(x)≡p2(x))]
|Fd|2 .
Thus,Prf,g∈Fd [(hi(x1) < m
i
1)∧(hj(x2) < mj2)] =
∑
p1,p2∈Fd
Pr[(p1(x1)<m
i
1)∧(p2(x2)<mj2)]
|Fd|2 =
∑
p1,p2∈Fd
Pr[p1(x1)<m
i
1]·Pr[p2(x2)<mj2]
|Fd|2 =
∑
p1∈Fd
∑
p2∈Fd
Pr[p1(x1)<m
i
1]
|Fd| ·
Pr[p2(x2)<m
j
2]
|Fd| =
(1± γ)2 1|X1|·|X2|
3 Fingerprinting Using Pseudo-Random Hashes
Several methods were suggested for building fingerprints for approximating relations
between massive datasets, such as the Jackard similarity (see [6] for example). Given
a universe U , where |U | = u, consider C1, C2, where each Ci ⊆ U is described as
a set |Ci| integers in [u] (we use [u] to denote {1, 2, . . . , u}). The Jackard similarity
is J1,2 =
|C1∩C2|
|C1∪C2| . Many fingerprints rely on applying many hashes to each elements
in the long streams. We use a the hashes of Section 2 to exponentially speed up such
computations. We use pseudo-random effects in this hash, so we must relax the MWIF
requirement to a pairwise independence requirement (2-wise independence).
For completeness, we briefly consider previously suggested approaches for approx-
imating Jackard similarity [6]. Let h ∈ H be a randomly chosen function from a MWIF
H . We can apply h on all elements C1 and examine the minimal integer we get, mh1 =
argminx∈C1 h(x). We can do the same to C2 and examine m
h
2 = argminx∈C2 h(x).
Fingerprints for estimating the Jackard similarity are based on computing the probabil-
ity thatm1 = m2:Prh∈H [mh1 = m
h
2 ] = Prh∈H [argminx∈C1 h(x) = argminx∈C2 h(x)].
Theorem 1 (Jackard and MWIF Collision Probability). Prh∈H [mhi = mhj ] = Ji,j .
The proof is given in [6], and in the appendix for completeness.
Similarly, regarding a hash h from a γ-MWIF, [5,6] shows that:
Theorem 2. |Prh∈H [mhi = mhj ]− Ji,j | ≤ γ.
Rather than maintaining the full Ci’s, previous approaches [5,6] suggest maintain-
ing their fingerprints. Given k hashes h1, . . . , hk randomly chosen from an γ-MWIF,
we can maintain mh1i , . . . ,m
hk
i . Given Ci, Cj , for any x ∈ [k], the probability that
mhxi = m
hx
j is Ji,j ± γ. A hash hx where we have mhxi = mhxj is called a hash col-
lision. We can thus estimate J by counting the proportion of collision hashes out of
all the chosen hashes. In this approach, the fingerprint contains k item identities in [u],
since for any x, mhxi is in [u]. Thus, such a fingerprint requires k log u bits. To achieve
an accuracy  and confidence δ, such approaches require k = O( ln
1
δ
2 ). Our basis for
the fingerprint is a “block fingerprint” which allows approximating Ji,j with a given
accuracy  and a confidence of 78 . This block fingerprint maintains only a single bit
per hash, as opposed to previous approaches which maintain log u bits per hash. Later
we show how to achieve a given accuracy  with a given confidence δ, by combining
several block fingerprints, and creating a full fingerprint.
To shorten the fingerprints using a single bit per hash, we use a hash mapping el-
ements in [u] to a single bit — φ : [u] → {0, 1}, taken from a pairwise independent
family (PWIF for short) of such hashes. Rather than defining mhi = argminx∈C1 h(x)
we define mφ,hi = φ(argminx∈C1 h(x)). Maintaining m
φ,h
i rather than m
φ
i shortens
the fingerprint by a factor of log u. We examine the resulting accuracy and confidence.
Theorem 3. Prh∈H [mφ,hi = m
φ,h
j ] =
Ji,j
2 +
1
2 ± γ2 .
Proof. Prh∈H,φ∈H′ [m
φ,h
i = m
φ,h
j ] = Pr[m
φ,h
i = m
φ,h
j |mhi = mhj ] · Prh∈H [mhi =
mhj ] + Pr[m
φ,h
i = m
φ,h
j |mhi 6= mhj ] · Prh∈H [mhi 6= mhj ] = 1 · Prh∈H [mhi = mhj ] +
1
2 · (1− Prh∈H [mhi = mhj ]) = 1+Ji,j±γ2
The purpose of the fingerprint block is to provide an approximation of J with
accuracy . We use k hashes, and choose k = 8.022 . Denote α =
210−1
210 , and let
γ = (1 − α) ·  = 1210 . We construct a γ-MWIF 3. To construct the family, consider
choosing a0, . . . , ad and b0, b1, . . . , bd uniformly at random from [p], constructing the
polynomials f(x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+. . .+adxd, g(x) = b0+b1x+b2x2+. . .+bdxd,
and using the k hashes hi(x) = f(x)+ ig(x), where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k−1}. We also use
a hash φ : [u] → {0, 1} chosen from the PWIF of such hashes. We say there is a colli-
sion on hl if m
φ,hl
i = m
φ,hl
j , and denote the random variable Zl where Zl = 1 if there
is a collision on hl for users i, j and Zl = 0 if there is no such collision. Zl = 1 with
probability 12+
J
2 ± γ2 and Zl = 0 with probability 12− J2 ± γ2 . ThusE(Zl) = 12+ J2 ± γ2 .
Denote Xl = 2Zl − 1. E(Xl) = 2E(Zl) − 1 = J ± γ. Xl can take two values, −1
when Zl = 0, and 1 when Zl = 1. ThusX2l always takes the value of 1, soE(X
2
l ) = 1.
Consider X =
∑k
l=1Xl, and take Y = Jˆ =
X
k as an estimator for J . We show that for
the above choice of k, Y is accurate up to  with probability of at least 78 .
Theorem 4 (Simple Estimator). Pr(|Y − J | ≤ ) ≥ 78 . Proof given in appendix.
Due to Theorem 4, we can approximate J with accuracy  and confidence 78 using
a “block fingerprint” for Ci, composed of m
h1,φ1
i , . . . ,m
hk,φk
i , where h1, . . . , hk are
randomly constructed members of a γ-MWIF and φ1, . . . , φk are chosen from the PWIF
of hashes φ : [u]→ {0, 1}. We shows that it suffices to take k = O( 12 ) to achieve this.
Constructing each hi can be done by choosing f, g using the base random construction
and composing hi(x) = f(x) + i · g(x). The base random construction chooses f, g
uniformly at random from Fd, the family of d-degree polynoms in Zp, where d =
O(log 1 ). This achieves a γ-MWIF where γ = (1− α) ·  = 1210 .
Achieving a Desired Confidence We combine several independent fingerprints to in-
crease the confidence to a desired level δ. Section 3 used a fingerprint of length k to
achieve a confidence of 78 . Consider taking m fingerprints for each stream, each of
length k. Given two streams, i, j, we havem pairs of fingerprints, each approximating J
with accuracy , and confidence 78 . Denote the estimators we obtain as Jˆ1, Jˆ2, . . . , Jˆm,
and denote the median of these values as Jˆ . Consider using m > 329 ln
1
δ “blocks”.
Theorem 5 (Median Estimator). Pr(|Jˆ −J | ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ. Proof given in appendix.
Due to Theorem 5 to make sure that |Jˆ − J | ≤  it suffices to take m > 329 ln 1δ
fingerprints, each with k = 8.022 hashes. In total, it is enough to take
32
9 ln
1
δ · 8.022 ≤
28.45 ln 1δ
2 hashes. Thus, we use O(
ln 1δ
2 ) hashes, storing a single bit per hash.
3 The accuracy γ is much stronger than the overall accuracy  required of the full fingerprint,
for reasons to be later examined
4 Fast Method for Computing the Fingerprint
We discuss speeding up the fingerprint computation. Consider computing the fingerprint
for a set of b items X = {x1, . . . , xb} where xi ∈ [u]. The fingerprint is composed of
m “block fingerprints”, where block r is constructed using k hashes hr1, . . . , h
r
k, built
using 2 · d random coefficients in Zp. The i’th location in the block is the minimal
item in X under hi: mi = argminx∈X hi(x), which is then hashed through a hash φ
mapping elements in [u] to a single bit. We show how to quickly compute the block
fingerprint (m1, . . . ,mk). A naive way to do this is applying k · b hashes to compute
hi(xj) for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [b]. The values hi(xi) where i ∈ [k], j ∈ [b] form a matrix,
where row i has the values (hi(x1), . . . , hi(xb)), illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. A fingerprint “chunk” for a stream.
Once all hi(xj) values are computed for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [b] , for each row i we
check for which column j the row’s minimal value occurs, and store mi = xj , as
illustrated in the left of Figure 2. Thus, computing the fingerprint requires finding
the minimal value across the rows (or more precisely, the value xj for the column j
where this minimal value occurs). To speed up the process, we use a method similar
to the one discussed in [18] as a building block. Recall the hashes hi were defined
as hi(x) = f(x) + ig(x) where f(x), g(x) are d-degree polynomials with random
coefficients in Zp. Our algorithm is based on a procedure that gets a value x ∈ [u]
and a threshold t, and returns all elements in (h0(x), h1(x), . . . , hk−1(x)) which are
smaller than t, as well as their locations. Formally, the method returns the index list
It = {i|hi(x) ≤ t} and the value list Vt = {hi(x)|i ∈ It} (note these are lists, so
the j’th location in Vt, Vt[j], contains hIt[j](x)). We call this the column procedure,
and denote by pr− small− loc(f(x), g(x), k, x, t) the function that returns It, and by
pr−small−val(f(x), g(x), k, x, t) the function that returns Vt . We describe a certain
implementation of these operations in Section 4.1. The running time of this implemen-
tation is O(log k + |It|), rather than the naive algorithm which evaluates O(k) hashes.
Thus, this procedure quickly finds small elements across columns (where by “small”
we mean smaller than t). This is illustrated on the right of Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Finding small elements across columns rather than minimal elements across
rows
Roughly speaking, our algorithm maintains a bound for the minimal value for each
row, and operates by going through the columns, finding the small values in each of
them, and updating the bounds for the rows where these occur.
block − update((x1, . . . , xb), f(x), g(x), k, t) :
1. Let mi =∞ for i ∈ [k]
2. Let pi = 0 for i ∈ [k]
3. For j = 1 to b:
(a) Let It = pr − small − val(f(x), g(x), k, xj , t)
(b) Let Vt = pr − small − loc(f(x), g(x), k, xj , t)
(c) For y ∈ It: // Indices of the small elements
i. If mIt[y] > Vt[y] // Update to row x required
A. mIt[y] = Vt[y]
B. pIt[y] = xj
If our method updates mi, pi for row i, once the procedure is done, mi indeed
contains the minimal value in that row, and pi the column where this minimal value
occurs, since if even a single update occurred then the row indeed contains an item
that is smaller than t, so the minimal item in that row is smaller than t and an update
would occur for that item. On the other hand, if all the items in a row are bigger than
t, an update would not occur for that row. The running time of the column procedure is
O(log k + |It|), which is a random variable, that depends on the number of elements
returned for that column, |It|. Denote byLj the number of elements returned for column
j (i.e. |It| for column j). Since we have b columns, the running time of the block update
isO(b log k)+O(
∑b
j=1 Lj). The total number of returned elements is
∑b
j=1 Lj , which
is the total number of elements that are smaller than t. We denote by Yt =
∑b
j=1 Lj the
random variable which is the number of all elements in the block that are smaller than
t. The running time of our block update is thus O(b log k + Yt).
The random variable Yt depends on t, since the smaller t is the less elements are
returned and the faster the column procedure runs. On the other hand, we only update
rows whose minimal value is below t, so if t is too low we have a high probability
of having rows which are not updated correctly. We show that a certain compromise
t value allows achieving both a good running time of the block update, with a good
probability of correctly computing the values for all the rows.
Theorem 6. Given the threshold t = 12·p·l
′
b , where l
′ = 80+2 log 1 (so l
′ = O(log 1 )),
the runtime of the block − update procedure is O(b log 1 + 12 log 1 ).
Proof. Recall that to get a γ-MWIF (for γ = 1210 ) we used d = O(log
1
γ ) as the
degree of the random polynoms f, g in the base random construction, used to compose
the h1, . . . , hk hashes. Examining the constant in the work of Indyk [12] shows that the
requirement is d > 80 + 2 log 1 . Denote l
′ = 80 + 2 log 1 . Due to our choice of d we
have d > l′, so the hashes h1, . . . , hk were effectively chosen at random from an l′-wise
independent family. Let H be an l′ − wise independent family of hashes. Consider the
following equation from [12], regarding Et, the expected number of elements x ∈ X
such that h(x) ≤ t (i.e. elements that are smaller than t under h chosen at random from
H): Pr[minx∈Xh(x) > t] ≤ 48
(
6·l′
Et
)(l′−1)/2
.
When computing the fingerprint for the elements in X , we know |X|4 and denoted
|X| = b. Each hi is γ-MWIF, so Et = tbp . Now consider choosing t = 12·p·l
′
b .
Under this choice5 of t = 12l
′·p
b we have Et =
tb
p = 12l
′ and using the fact that
l′ = 80 + 2 log 1 the above lemma can be rewritten as: Pr[minx∈Xh(x) > t] <
48
(
6l′
Et
)(l′−1)/2
= 48 · ( 12) 792 · ( 12)2 log 1 < 1233 · 2. There are k rows, and by applying
the union bound we obtain: Pr[∃i ∈ [k](minx∈Xhi(x) > t] < k·233 = 8.02·
2
28.9·2 <
1
229 .
We prove our algorithm runs in time O(b log 1 +
1
2 log
1
 ) with high probability.
We have kb random values, h1(x1), . . . , hk−1(xb), which are (at least) pairwise inde-
pendent. Denote Yi,j the indicator variable of the event that hj(xi) < t = 12pl
′
b , and so
Pr[Yi,j = 1] =
12l′
b and E[Yi,j = 1] =
12l′
b . Then Y =
∑b
i=0
∑k−1
j=0 Yi,j . The running
time of the algorithm isO(b log 1+Y ). We show that Y = O(
1
2 log
1
 ) with high prob-
ability6. We obtain: E[Y ] = E[
∑b
i=0
∑k−1
j=0 Yi,j ] =
∑b
i=0
∑k−1
j=0 E[Yi,j ] = 12 · l′ · k.
We use the following lemma, proven in the appendix: V ar(Y ) ≤ E(Y ), and using
Chebychev’s inequality obtain: Pr[Y > 11E(Y )] ≤ Pr[|Y −E(Y )| > 10V ar(Y )] <
1
100 . To guarantee the required run time in a worst case analysis, we can drop all the
4 We use this assumption for simplicity. If we don’t know |X|, we can update the threshold
t online. We store all elements until we have log
1
δ
2
elements. Then we set t according to
b = 2
log 1
δ
2
. We double b by 2 each time |X| > b and update t according to the new b.
5 Notice that this constant is only to bound the worst case usually in a block the maximum
between the minimal values is about l′ moreover we can improve the running time if we drop
from the sketch all the hash functions which there minimal value is to big.
6 We base our calculation on the pairwise independence of Yi,j . Notice that Yi,j is more inde-
pendent when running over i. Therefor in practice the constants are smaller.
blocks which require too long to compute. This reduces our probability of success in
each block from 78 to at least
7
8 − 2−29 − 1100 (The 2−29 factor is due to the probability
that there exists a hash that gets a minimum value higher than t). Taking 4 log 1δ blocks
still obtains this probability. Overall the algorithm runs in time O(b log 1 +
1
2 log
1
 )
per block, or O(log 1δ (b log
1
 +
1
2 log
1
 )) for all blocks.
4.1 Computing The Minimal Elements of the Pseudo-Random Series
We give a recursive implementation of pr − small − loc(f(x), g(x), k, x, t) and pr −
small − val(f(x), g(x), k, x, t), the procedures for computing Vt and It. Recall the
hashes hi were defined as hi(x) = f(x) + ig(x) where f(x), g(x) are d-degree poly-
nomials with random coefficients in Zp. Consider a given element x ∈ Zp for which
we attempt to find all the values (and indices) in (h0(x), h2(x), . . . , hk−1(x)) smaller
than t. Given x, we can evaluate f(x), g(x) in time O(d) = O(log 1γ )
7, and denote
a = f(x) ∈ Zp and b = g(x) ∈ Zp. Thus, we are seek all values in {a mod p, (a+ b)
mod p, (a + 2b) mod p, . . . , (a + (k − 1)b) mod p} smaller than t, and the in-
dices i where they occur. Consider the series S = (s1, . . . , sk) where si = (a + ib)
mod p and i = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. We denote the arithmetic series a + bi mod p for
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} as S(a, b, k, p), so under this notation S = S(a, b, k, p).
Given a value we can find the index where it occurs, and vice versa. To compute the
value for index i, we compute (a+ ib) mod p. To compute the index i where a value v
occurs, we solve v = a+ ib in Zp (i.e. i = v−ab mod p). This can be done in O(log p)
time using Euclid’s algorithm. Note we compute b−1 in Zp only once to transform all
values to generating indices8. We call a location i where si < si−1 a flip location. The
first index is a flip location if a− b mod p > a. First, consider the case b < p2 . If si is
a flip location, we have si−1 < p but si−1+ b > p, so si < b. Also, since b < p2 there is
at least one location which is not a flip location between any two flip locations. Given
S = S(a, b, k, p), denote by f(S) the flip locations in S.
Lemma 3 (Flip Locations Are Small). When b < p2 , at most
k
2 elements are flip loca-
tions, and all elements that are smaller than b are flip locations.
Proof. Note that the non-flip locations between any two flip locations are monotonically
increasing. Any flip location has a value of at most b, since the element before a flip
location is smaller than p (modulo p), and adding b to it exceeds p, but through this
addition it is impossible to exceed p by more than b.
We denoted by f(S) the flip locations of S. Denote f0(S) = f(S). Denote by
f1(S) all elements that occur directly after a flip location, f2(S) all elements that occur
7 Using multipoint evaluation we can calculate it in amortized time O(log2 log 1
γ
). Moreover
we can use other constructions for d-wise independent which can be evaluate in O(1) time in
the cost of using more space.
8 We can store a table of inverse to further reduce processing time. If the required memory for
the table is unavailable, we can do the computation in Fpc for smaller p and store table of
size p and then calculating the inverse requires O(c log c) time. Notice that we can easily take
c < log log 1
δ
2
u which will probably be less then log 1

exactly two places after the closest flip locations (i.e they cannot be flip locations) and
by fi(S) all elements that occur i places after the closest flip location.
Lemma 4 (Element Comparison). When b < p2 , if x ∈ fi(S) and y ∈ fj(S) where
i > j, then x > y.
Proof. All flip locations have a value of at most b. Due to Lemma 3, a location directly
after a flip location is not a flip location, and is thus bigger than the flip location before
it by exactly b, and is thus greater than b. Thus any element in f1(S) must be greater
than any element in f0(S). Using the same argument, we see that any element in f2(S)
is greater than any element in f1(S) and so on. A simple induction completes the proof.
The first flip location is dp−ab e, as to exceed pwe add b dp−ab e times. Also, the num-
ber of flip locations is ba+bkp c. Denote the first flip location as j = dp−ab e, with value
a′ = (a+ jb) mod p. Denote b′ = (b− p) mod b and the number of flip locations as
k′ = b (a+bk)p c. The flip locations are known to also be an arithmetic progression [18] 9.
Lemma 5 (Flip Locations Arithmetic Progression). The flip locations of S = S(a, b, k, p)
are also an arithmetic progression S′ = (a′, b′, k′, b).
Given the above lemmas, we can search for the elements smaller than t, by examin-
ing the flip locations series in recursion. If case b < t, given q = dteb, due to Lemma 4
f(S), f1(S), . . . fq−1(S) are smaller then t, and all of their elements must be returned.
We must also scan fq(S) and also return all the elements of fq(S) which are smaller
then t. This additional scan requires O(|fq(S)|) time |fq(S)| ≤ |f(S)|. Thus this case
of b < t examinesO(|It|) elements. Due to Lemma 3, if b > t, all non-flip locations are
bigger than b and thus bigger than t, and thus we must only consider the flip-locations as
candidates. Using Lemma 5 we can scan the flip locations recursively by examining the
arithmetic series of the flip locations. If at most half of the elements in each recursion
are flip locations, this results in a logarithmic running time. However, if b is high more
than half the elements are flip locations. For the case where b > p2 we can examine the
same flip-location series S′, in reverse order. The first element in the reversed series
would be the last element of the current series, and rather than progressing in steps of b,
we progress in steps of p− b. This way we obtain exactly the same elements, but in re-
verse order. However, in this reversed series, at most half the elements are flip locations.
The following procedure implements the above method. It finds elements smaller then
t in time O(log k) = O(log 1 + |It|) where |It| is the number of such values. Given the
returned indices, we get the values in them. We use the same b for all |It|, so this can
be done in time O(c log c+ |It|) (Usually c is a constant).
ps−min(a, b, p, k, t) :
1. if b < t:
(a) Vt = []
(b) if a < t then Vt = Vt + [a+ ib for i in range (d t−ab e)]
(c) j = dp−ab e // First flip (excluding first location)
9 See Lemma 2 page 11.
(d) while j < k:
i. v = (a+ jb) mod p
ii. while j < k and v < t:
A. Vt.append(v)
B. j = j + 1
C. v = v + b
iii. j = j + dp−vb e //next flip location
iv. return list1
(e) if b > p2 then return f((a+ (k − 1) · b) mod p, p− b, p, k, t)
(f) j = dp−ab e
(g) newk = ba+bkp c
(h) if a < b then j = 0 and newk = newk+1// calculate the first flip location and
the number of flip locations
(i) return f((a+ jb) mod p,−p mod b, b, newk, t)
5 Conclusions
We have presented a fast method for computing fingerprints of massive datasets, based
on pseudo-random hashes. We note that although we have examined the Jackard simi-
larity in detail, the exact same technique can be used for any fingerprint which is based
on minimal elements under several hashes. Thus we have described a general technique
for exponentially speeding up computation of such fingerprints. Our analysis has used
fingerprints using a single bit per hash. We have shown that even for these small finger-
prints which can be quickly computed, the required number of hashes is asymptotically
similar to previously known methods, and is logarithmic in the required confidence and
polynomial in the required accuracy. Several directions remain open for future research.
Can we speed up the fingerprint computation even further? Can similar techniques be
used for computing fingerprints that are not based on minimal elements under hashes?
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6 Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1: Prh∈H [mhi = m
h
j ] = Ji,j .
Proof. Denote x = J1,2. The set Ci ∪ Cj contains three types of items: items that
appear only in Ci, items that appear only in Cj , and items that appear in Ci ∩ Cj .
When an item in Ci ∩ Cj is minimal under h, i.e., for some a ∈ Ci ∩ Cj we have
h(a) = minx∈C1∪C2h(x), we get that minx∈Cih(x) = minx∈Cjh(x). On the other
hand, if for some a ∈ Ci∪Cj such that a /∈ Ci∩Cj we have h(a) = minx∈C1∪C2h(x),
the probability that minx∈Cih(x) = minx∈Cjh(x) is negligible
10. Since H is MWIF,
any element in C = Ci ∪ Cj is equally likely to be minimal under h. However, only
elements in I = Ci ∩ Cj would result in mhi = mhj . Thus Prh∈H [mhi = mhj ] =
1
|Ci∪Cj | · |Ci ∩ Cj | =
|Ci∩Cj |
|Ci∪Cj | = Ji,j .
The proof of Theorem 4 (Simple Estimator for Jackard With Single Bit Per Hash):
Pr(|Y − J | ≤ ) ≥ 78 .
10 Such an event requires that two different items, xi ∈ Ci and xj ∈ Cj would be mapped to the
same value h∗ = h(xi) = h(xj), and that this value would also be the minimal value obtained
when applying h to both all the items in Ci and in Cj . As discussed in [12], the probability for
this is negligible when the range of h is large enough.
Proof. Our proof uses Chebychev’s inequality:
Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ ) ≤ V ar(X)
2
We have:
E(X) = E(
k∑
l=1
Xl) =
k∑
l=1
E(Xl) = k · (J ± γ)
(J − γ) ≤ E(Y ) ≤ (J + γ)
We now bound V ar(X):
V ar(X) = E(X2)− E2(X)
= E((
k∑
l=1
Xl)
2)− E2(
k∑
l=1
Xl)
= E(
k∑
l=1
X2l + 2
∑
i 6=j
XiXj)− (E(
k∑
l=1
Xl))
2
=
k∑
l=1
E(X2l ) + 2
∑
i 6=j
E(XiXj)− (
k∑
l=1
E(Xl))
2
=
k∑
l=1
E(X2l ) + 2
∑
i 6=j
E(XiXj)− (
k∑
l=1
E(Xl)
2 + 2
∑
i 6=j
E(Xi)E(Xj))
=
k∑
l=1
E(X2l ) + 2
∑
i 6=j
E(Xi)E(Xj)− (
k∑
l=1
E(Xl)
2 + 2
∑
i6=j
E(Xi)(Xj))
=
k∑
l=1
E(X2l )−
k∑
l=1
E(Xl)
2 ≤ k
(1)
We use this to bound V ar(Y ):
V ar(Y ) = V ar(
1
k
·X) = 1
k2
V ar(X) ≤ 1
k2
· k ≤= 1
k
Using Chebychev’s inequality we get that:
Pr(|Y − E(Y )| > β) ≤ V ar(Y )
β2
≤ 1
k · β2
Denote α = 2
10−1
210 . Let β = α · , so we obtain:
Thus using our choice of k = 8.022 and β = α ·  (and noting that J ≤ 1,  ≤ 1) we
have:
Pr(|Y − E(Y )| > β) ≤ 1
kβ2
=
1
k · α2 · 2 =
1
8.0001
≤ 1
8
Proof of Theorem 5 (Median Estimator for Jackard): Pr(|Jˆ − J | ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. We use Hoeffding’s inequality [11]. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random
variables, where all Xi are bounded so that Xi ∈ [ai, bi], and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi.
Hoeffding’s inequality states that:
Pr(X − E[X] ≥ n) ≤ exp
(
− 2n
2 2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
We say that the estimator Jˆl is good if |Jˆl−J | ≤  and that Jˆl is bad if |Jˆl−J | > .
Each estimator Jˆl is bad with probability of p ≤ 18 . Consider the random variable Xl
where Xl = 1 if Jˆl is bad, and Xl = 0 if Jˆl is good. We have Pr(Xl = 1) = p ≤ 18 ,
so E(Xl) = p ≤ 18 . Denote X =
∑m
l=1Xl, so E(X) = m · p ≤ ·m · 18 . We now note
that the Jˆ can be bad only if at least half the estimators Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆm are bad, or in other
words, when X ≥ m2 .
The Xl’s are independent, since for any x, y the hashes used to obtain the Jˆx are
independent of the hashes used to obtain the Jˆy . Since p ≤ 18 we have:
Pr(X ≥ m
2
) ≤ Pr(X ≥ (3
8
+ p) ·m) = Pr(X −mp ≥ 3
8
m)
However,E(X) = mp, so using Hoeffding’s inequality, we require that Pr(X ≥ m2 ) ≤
δ:
Pr(X ≥ m
2
) ≤ Pr(X −mp ≥ 3
8
m) ≤ exp(−2m · 9
64
) ≤ δ
Extracting m we obtain that we require:
m >
32
9
ln
1
δ
Proof of the lemma in Theorem 6:
Lemma 6. Let Y =
∑b
i=0
∑k−1
j=0 Yi,j in Theorem 6. Then V ar[Y ] ≤ E[Y ].
Proof.
V ar[Y ] = E[Y 2]− E2[Y ] = E[(
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
Yi,j)
2]− E2[
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
Yi,j ]
= E[
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
Y 2i,j + 2
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′ 6=j
Yi,jYi′,j′ ]− (
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ])
2
=
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Y 2i,j ] + 2
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′ 6=j
E[Yi,jYi′,j′ ]− (
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]
2 + 2
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′ 6=j
E[Yi,j ][Yi′,j′ ])
=
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Y 2i,j ] + 2
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′ 6=j
E[Yi,j ][Yi′,j′ ]− (
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]
2 + 2
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′ 6=j
E[Yi,j ][Yi′,j′ ])
=
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Y 2i,j ]−
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]
2 =
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]−
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]
2
= E[Y ]−
b∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=0
E[Yi,j ]
2 ≤ E[Y ]
(2)
